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King Sang Chow v. Immigration and Naturalization
Services: The Constitutionality of Section 440(a) of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
I. Introduction
When President Clinton signed "The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"' (AEDPA), he praised the
bill's comprehensive approach toward fighting domestic and
international terrorism.' While applauding the legislation's
provisions increasing controls over biological and chemical
weapons and strengthening penalties for a range of terrorist
crimes, he lamented that the bill "also makes a number of major,
ill-advised changes in our immigration laws having nothing to do
with fighting terrorism."3  He called upon Congress to enact
immigration reform to correct AEDPA provisions that "eliminat[e]
remedial relief for long-term legal residents of the United States."4
Nearly a year and a half after the enactment of the AEDPA,
immigration reform has no momentum on Capitol Hill, and the
effects of the AEDPA are being felt by large numbers of
permanent resident aliens whose petitions for review of final
deportation orders are receiving uniform denials.5
Protests and judicial challenges of the AEDPA abound in the
federal court system.6 Arguments raised against the AEDPA range
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
2 See Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing S. 1965, 32
WEEKLY COw. PREs. Doc. 719 (Apr. 29, 1996) ("This legislation is an important
forward step in the Federal Government's continuing efforts to combat terrorism.").
3Id.
4 Id.
5 See Morning Edition: Challenge to Immigrant Deportations (NPR radio
broadcast, Aug. 20, 1997) available in 1997 WL 12822295 ("Officials at the
Immigration and Naturalization Service say 93,000 criminal immigrants will be deported
by the end of September, partly because Congress restricted rules that allow an
immigrant to fight a deportation order.").
6 See generally Ethan I. Davis, Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of
Cases Affecting the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 6 B.U.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 23
from the constitutionality of its "gatekeeping" provisions for filing
second or successive habeas applications to its retroactive
application to petitions pending at the time of its enactment.7
Although the Supreme Court has examined neither the tension
between the AEDPA and the due process rights of alien residents
nor the challenges made under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the intricacies are receiving attention from circuit courts
and legal scholars. In time, these constitutional issues plaguing
the AEDPA will certainly come before the Supreme Court.8 The
Seventh Circuit confronted these challenges and refined the
constitutional minimums required to meet due process challenges
in Kim Sang Chow v. INS.9
PUB. INT. L.J. 333 (1996) (providing an overview of numerous cases arising from the
enactment of the AEDPA in the federal court system).
7 See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2337-38 (1996); see also Figueroa-Rabio
v. INS, 108 F.3d 110 (6th Cir. 1997) (providing that the AEDPA may be applied to
pending cases because it is a prospective jurisdictional statute); Arevalo-Lopez v. INS,
104 F.3d 100 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that pursuant to the AEDPA, federal courts of
appeal lacked jurisdiction to review BIA decisions); Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d
352 (11 th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the application of the AEDPA to pending cases
does not violate substantive rights, the Due Process Clause, or the judicial power
provisions of Article III); Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996) (determining that
as long as some form of habeas relief was available to the petitioner, the constitutional
issue of whether an administrative body was able to make an independent judicial
determination need not be addressed); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d. 27 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that the repeal of the federal courts' jurisdiction over final deportation orders
was constitutionally valid because other avenues of judicial relief were available);
Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that section 440(a) of the
AEDPA revokes the court's jurisdiction over final petitions for review); Mendez-Rosas
v. INS, 87 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming that absent express congressional intent,
the effective date of section 440(a) was the date of its enactment); Duldulao v. INS, 90
F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that section 440(a) is a jurisdictional statute applying
to pending cases and that it does not violate either the Due Process Clause or the
separation of powers).
8 See generally Lawrence E. Harkenrider, Due Process or "Summary" Justice?:
The Alien Terrorist Removal Provisions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 143 (1996) (discussing the AEDPA's
'Alien Terrorist Removal' provision in light of the constitutional rights of aliens and the
role of the plenary power doctrine in the area of immigration legislation); Note, The
Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Review for Administrative Deportation
Decisions, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1850 (1997) (suggesting that the Due Process Clause and
Article III present constitutional limits on the plenary power of Congress over
immigration legislation).
9 113 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1997).
1998] ANTiTERRORISM AND EFFECrVE DEATH PENALTY ACT 449
This Note explores the development of constitutional
challenges to the AEDPA. Part II discusses the facts, procedural
history, and recent Seventh Circuit resolution of King Sang Chow
v. NS."0 Part III identifies and examines case law relevant to
understanding the constitutional challenges brought under the Due
Process Clause." Part IV explores the significance and
implications of the Chow decision and other circuit court decisions
in determining the scope of judicial review of final deportation
orders. Finally, Part V concludes the Note by discussing the
impact of Chow on the constitutionally mandated procedural due
process requirements, as well as its impact on judicial review of
final deportation orders. 3
II. Statement of the Case
A. Background and Lower Court Decisions
The petitioner, King Sang Chow, a native of Hong Kong and
citizen of the United Kingdom, immigrated to the United States in
1971. Chow entered the United States as a permanent resident
alien, married a U.S. citizen, and continued to reside in the United
States. While living in the United States, Chow was convicted
twice: 1) in 1977 for unlawful possession of a gun in New Jersey
state court, and 2) in 1991 for the use of a telephone to expedite
the distribution of heroin in the Eastern District Court of New
York."  Based on these convictions, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) commenced deportation proceedings
in 1992. Under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA),
an Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Chow was deportable
pursuant to section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien charged with a
controlled substance violation and pursuant to section 241 (a)(2)(C)
10 See infra notes 14-83 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 84-195 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 196-230 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
'4 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 662.
Is See id.
16 See id.
17 See id.
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as an alien charged with a firearm violation. The IJ denied
Chow's request for discretionary relief from deportation under
section 212(c) of the INA.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the Fifth Circuit
upheld the IJ's decision."0 Based on a subsequent BIA decision,
Chow moved the BIA to reopen the deportation proceedings by
11 See id.; see also Immigration and Naturalization Act § 241, which provided:
(a) Any alien (including an alien crewman) in the United States shall, upon
the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one
or more of the following classes of deportable aliens: ....
(2) Criminal offenses.
(B) Controlled Substances.
(i) Conviction. Any alien who at any time after entry has
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt
to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled
substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802)), other than a single
offense involving possession for one's own use of 30
grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.
(ii) Drug abusers and addicts. Any alien who is, or at any time
after entry has been, a drug abuser or addict is deportable.
(C) Certain firearms offenses. Any alien who at any time after
admission is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling,
offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or
carrying, or of attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, offer
for sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, any weapon, part
or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device (as defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 92 1(a)) in violation of any law is deportable.
8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 1996) (Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, redesignated as § 237 by
Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, subtit. A, § 305(a)(2), 110
Stat. 3009-598, and transferred to 8 U.S.C. § 1227).
19 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 662; see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1996), repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 304(b),
110 Stat. 3009-597 (1996) (stating that aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence
who have resided in the United States for at least seven consecutive years may apply for
relief at the discretion of the Attorney General) [hereinafter INA]. However such relief
"shall not apply to an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed any
criminal offense covered in section 125 1(a)(2)(A)(ii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title .... "
8 U.S.C. § 1251. Thus, the possibility of relief under 212(c) in the present case is
foreclosed. See supra note 18.
20 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 662.
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arguing that he was entitled to relief from deportation." The BIA
rejected Chow's motion and Chow filed a petition for review of
that order in the Seventh Circuit.22 Maintaining that new facts
qualified him for relief under sections 212(c) and 245 of the INA,
Chow also filed a second motion to reconsider the deportation
proceedings.23 Once again, the BIA denied his motion, and Chow
filed a petition with the Seventh Circuit to review that order.
24
The Seventh Circuit consolidated Chow's claims and stayed
the proceedings upon his request.' During the stayed period,
President Clinton signed AEDPA.26 Following the newly enacted
legislation, the INS moved to dismiss Chow's claim asserting that
section 440(a) of the AEDPA divested the court of jurisdiction
over the matter."
B. The Seventh Circuit's Decision
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that, on its face, section
440(a) appeared to deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
action." Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, section 106(a) of
the INA granted federal courts of appeal sole jurisdiction to
consider petitions requesting review of final deportation orders.29
Section 440(a) of the AEDPA, however, amended section 106(a)
so that "[a]ny final order .of deportation against an alien who is
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See id.; see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, amended by 8
U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West Supp. 1970 & 1996) (adjustment of status provision and
discretionary relief); INA, supra note 19, §212(c), 8 U.S.C. §1182(c) (discretionary
relief available).
24 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 662.
25 See id.
26 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
27 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 663.
28 See id.
29 Prior to the AEDPA amendment, INA section 106(a) provided: "The procedures
prescribed by, and all the provisions of chapter 158 of Title 28 shall apply to, and shall
be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of
deportation heretofore or hereafter made against aliens within the United States pursuant
to administrative proceedings ... ." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (Supp. 1994), repealed by Pub.
L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, §306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612 (1996).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense
covered in [sections 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of the INA],
or any offense covered by [section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA],
shall not be subject to review by any court."'3 Chow's convictions
were described within two of these enumerated sections, and he
did not contest the factual allegations of the charges against him."
Thus, Chow appeared deportable.
Chow challenged the applicability of section 440(a) to his
petition on several grounds. First, he argued that he was not
seeking review of a final "order of deportation" within the
meaning of section 440 of the AEDPA. Rather, he asserted his
petition involved the review of two BIA orders denying motions to
"reopen" or "reconsider" deportation proceedings which are not
included in the Act's definition of an "order of deportation.
33
The Seventh Circuit rejected his argument by interpreting an
"order of deportation" to include BIA orders and petitions for
review of such orders?4  Furthermore, the court considered
congressional intent and followed a line of Supreme Court and
appellate court decisions that have interpreted an "order of
deportation" to include orders denying motions to reopen and
reconsider.35  Thus, the court rejected Chow's claim that section
440(a) did not apply to his petition and concluded that it was
outside of the jurisdiction of the court.36
Secondly, since his petition for review was pending when the
AEDPA was enacted, Chow objected to the application of 440(a)
to his petition.37 The statutory language of section 440(a) does not
30 AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-77 (1996).
31 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 663.
32 See id. "A .32 caliber revolver is a firearm as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a).
Likewise, heroin is a controlled substance within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 802." Id.;
see also supra note 18 (detailing the relevant provisions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 1996)).
33 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 663.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 664 (citing Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964), Johnson v. INS,
962 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1992) and Oviawe v. INS, 853 F.2d 1428 (7th Cir. 1988)).
36 See id.
37 See id.
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include an effective date.3" In the absence of Congressional
direction to do so, courts usually do not apply a statute
retroactively. 9 The court noted, however, that "applying a newly
enacted statute to a pending case will not always result in
retroactive application."4o
Relying on the recent Supreme Court decision in Landgraf v.
USI Film Products,41 which prescribed the analysis for determining
a statute's application to pending cases, the court examined
whether section 440(a) of the AEDPA should apply to Chow's
petition for review. 2 Pursuant to Landgraf, when Congress does
not delineate a statute's proper reach, a court must rely upon
"judicial default rules."'3  Under the "judicial default rules," a
statute is presumptively effective on the date of enactment."
However, the Seventh Circuit's application of a statute remained
subject to certain limitations.45 In particular, if applying the statute
to a pending action would attach new legal consequences to
behavior transpiring prior to the statute's enactment, thereby
imposing a retroactive effect on the pending action, then the court
should not apply it."6 The Seventh Circuit relied on the language
of Landgraf which stated that a new legal consequence attached
when the statute "impair[ed] rights. that a party possessed when
enacted, increase[d] a party's liability for past conduct or
impose[d] new duties with respect to transactions already
38 See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (Supp. 1996); see also supra note 29 and
accompanying text (including text of amended provision). "Unlike section 440(a),
several provisions in the AEDPA contain express statements regarding each provision's
effect on pending proceedings or pre-enactment events. However, some of these
subsections provide that the subsections shall apply to pre-enactment conduct or pending
proceedings, while others provide that they shall not so apply." Chow, 113 F.3d at 665
n.3.
39 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
'o Chow, 113 F.3d at 664.
41 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
42 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 665.
43 Id. (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).
1 See id. (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264).
43 See id.
46 See id. (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
completed."' 7  Thus, the court needed to consider possible
unfairness when making the decision to apply a statute to a
pending action." Ultimately, the court had to "look to the nature
and extent of the change in the law and the degree and connection
between the operation of the new statute and the relevant past
conduct."49
Individuals do not usually rely on jurisdictional statutes, such
as 440(a), when conducting their activities. °  Specifically,
jurisdictional statutes "regulate secondary conduct rather than
primary conduct" and thereby limit an individual's ability to
invoke the presumption against retroactivity pursuant to
Landgraf5'
However, the Seventh Circuit examined whether Chow came
within a narrowly defined exception allowing certain individuals
to claim that the statute attached new legal consequences in
situations where petitioning aliens might have relied on the
availability of discretionary relief and judicial review when
making decisions of legal strategy, such as the concession of
deportability. 2 The court rejected Chow's argument that he
conceded deportability and decided to forego an opportunity to
contest deportability because he may have been entitled to
discretionary relief and judicial review." Rather, the court
determined that since Chow did not challenge the validity of his
47 Id. (quoting Landgraf 511 U.S. at 280).
48 See id. (citing Landgraf 511 U.S. at 280).
49 Id. (citing Landgraf 511 U.S. at 270).
50 See id.
51 Id. (citing Landgraf 511 U.S. at 275).
52 See id.; see also infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text (discussing Reyes-
Hernandez v. INS, 89 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to apply section 440(a) to a
pending petition because petitioning alien may have relied on discretionary relief or
judicial review when he conceded deportability)). An alien "concedes deportability"
when he admits the factual allegations or charges against him. Moreover, once an alien
concedes deportability and no issue of law or fact remains, "the applications for some
form of discretionary dispensation presents the only issue for decision." CHARLES
GORDON & HARRY N. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE 549-51 (1959).
53 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 666 (citing Reyes-Hernandez v. INS, 89 F.3d 490, 492
(7th Cir. 1996)) ("[B]efore section 440(a) went into effect, an alien who conceded
deportability might have been entitled to discretionary relief under section 212(c) of the
INA and judicial review if the IJ and BIA denied him relief.").
[Vol. 23
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convictions, nor did he indicate what arguments he would have
offered to contest his deportability or the findings of the IJ, section
440(a) barred review of his motions to reconsider and reopen
deportation proceedings.'
Chow's third objection to application of section 440(a) to his
petition was that it attached new legal consequences to his past
criminal behavior." At the time of his criminal conduct, pre-
AEDPA, he was deportable only after judicial review of the BIA
deportation order; however, after the statute's enactment, Chow
was deportable without judicial review. 6 He claimed that the
withdrawal of judicial review impermissibly attached new legal
consequences." The court disagreed and held that the withdrawal
of judicial review "does not increase Chow's liabilities or penalties
for the criminal conduct at issue because it merely alters the
procedure by which the INS may effect his deportation.""8 The
court held that deportation, as a consequence of certain criminal
acts did not, in itself, attach new liabilities to those acts;
specifically, section 440(a) modified the procedure of deportation,
but did not attach new legal consequences to Chow's pre-AEDPA
behavior.59
Finally, and most importantly for the present discussion, Chow
challenged the constitutionality of section 440(a).6 He argued that
section 440(a) violated his due process rights, the separation of
powers doctrine, and Article HI of the Constitution.6' Chow
asserted that both the BIA proceedings and the language of section
440(a) violated his due process rights by denying him judicial
review.62
Relying on various precedents, the court quickly outlined both
54 See id. at 666-67.
55 See id. at 667.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 Id.
59 See id.
60 See id. at 668.
61 See id.
62 See id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the due process rights of aliens and the plenary power of Congress
in immigration matters. 63 The Supreme Court has held that
permanent resident aliens are entitled to due process in deportation
proceedings." However, just months before Chow, the Seventh
Circuit decided that aliens do not have a due process right to
judicial review of BIA orders.65  Thus, with regard to Chow's
petition seeking review of the BIA's decision, "section 440(a)
does not offend his due process rights by foreclosing such
review.' '
While the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may
exercise its power over deportation and exclusion "with such
opportunity for judicial review of their action as Congress may
see fit to authorize or permit," it has also recognized that such
plenary power is subject to judicial intervention under the
"paramount law of the Constitution., 67
In Chow; the Seventh Circuit concluded that the "paramount law
of the Constitution" does not threaten section 440(a)'s viability
since resident aliens can seek other avenues of judicial review.61 If
alternative forms of relief did not exist, the court acknowledged,
"[W]e would be faced with the difficult task of determining to
what extent Congress may limit the jurisdiction of lower federal
courts to hear constitutional claims."'6 9
63 See infra notes 196-229 and accompanying text.
6 See id. (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982)).
65 See id. (citing Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1196-97 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Id. at 668.
67 Id. (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952)).
68 Id. Specifically, alternative forms of relief include a writ of habeas corpus in
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, or a writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 or an
art. I, sec. 9, cl. 2 writ in the Supreme Court. See id. at 669. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides
the district courts jurisdiction to authorize writs of habeas corpus for persons "in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(1), (3) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994). The All Writs Act provides courts
with the ability to issue a stay of actions that will deprive the court of its current or
prospective jurisdiction. Id. Finally, the Suspension Clause of the Constitution
guarantees a writ of habeas corpus, subject to restriction only "in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the Public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
69 Chow, 113 F.3d at 668 (citing Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 790 (1st Cir. 1996);
Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1996); Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309,
311 (3d Cir. 1996)).
[Vol. 23
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The court recognized that 440(a) does not eliminate all forms
of judicial review and examined other circuit decisions holding
that because some form of habeas relief exists, section 440(a)
withstands constitutional scrutiny." The court also compared the
language of section 440(a) to other sections of the AEDPA to
determine whether Congress intended to eliminate all forms of
judicial review under section 440(a).' Since the language of
440(a) does not include "sweeping prohibition of judicial review,"
the court concluded that it does not preclude all forms of judicial
review.72 Thus, "[b]ecause other avenues of judicial review remain
open to permanent resident aliens and because the Constitution
does not guarantee direct judicial review of deportation orders,
[the court held] that section 440(a) does not offend due process.
73
Despite the availability of other means of judicial relief, Chow
argued that the court should retain jurisdiction over his petition
because he had invoked "judicial intervention under 'the
paramount law of the Constitution."' 74  The court rejected his
contention by examining the statutory limits of its jurisdiction.
Because the court had been created by statute, it held that it only
had jurisdiction over issues conferred upon it by that statute. 6
Since Chow petitioned the court under section 106(a) of the INA,
the Seventh Circuit could consider Chow's arguments only under
the auspices of section 106(a), and the court's jurisdiction
disappeared with the modification of that section. With regard to
other avenues of judicial review, the court noted,
[W]hether Chow may seek a writ of habeas corpus in the district
70 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 668; see also supra note 68 (describing various forms of
statutory and constitutional habeas relief available to resident aliens).
71 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 668.
72 Id. at 669 (contrasting statutory language of section 440(a) with the expansive
language of section 423(a)).
73 Chow, 113 F.3d at 669.
74 Id. at 668 (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952)).
75 See id. at 669.
76 See id. (citing Sheldon v. Still, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850)). Courts created by
statute have "no jurisdiction other than that which has been conferred upon them by
statute." Id.
77 See id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or a writ pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1651 or an Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 writ in the Supreme Court
or whether some other jurisdictional basis for reviewing a
constitutional challenge to a deportation order exists is an issue
we need not decide here.78
The Seventh Circuit then dismissed Chow's arguments that
section 440(a) violates Article II of the Constitution or the
separation of powers doctrine.79 The court explained that Article
III delineates judicial power and authorizes Congress to establish
and define the jurisdiction of lower federal courts.80 The court
concluded, "Because the Constitution does not prescribe how
much judicial power must vest in the lower federal courts, but
rather, leaves that decision to Congressional discretion, a statute
which prescribes the limits of the courts' jurisdiction is not
unconstitutional unless it confers powers not enumerated
therein."'" Provided that Congress does not try to extend the lower
courts' jurisdiction beyond the bounds permitted by the
Constitution, Congress has the authority to strip lower courts of
their jurisdiction over certain cases or issues. 2 Therefore, section
440(a) did not violate Article I of the Constitution by defining
the jurisdictional limits of the appellate courts and granting the
BIA sole discretion over deportation orders. 3
III. Background Law
Given the relatively recent enactment of the AEDPA, courts
are still refining their interpretation of the law and wrestling with
the novel legal issues raised by the Act."' While most judicial
decisions have reached consistent conclusions with regard to
actions pending at the time of AEDPA enactment, at least one
78 Id. at 669-70; see supra note 68.
79 See Chow, 113 F.3d at 670.
80 See id. (citing Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 485
U.S. 50, 57-60 (1982)).
81 Id.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See supra note 7.
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court, in one case, refused to apply section 440(a) retroactively. 5
Additionally, circuit courts have largely ignored or avoided the
constitutional challenges to section 440(a) of the AEDPA. 6 The
nature of the due process and Article II separation of power
claims, however, are demonstrated by surveying recent decisions
in the First, Second, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.
A. The Exception to Retroactive Application of Section 440(a)
Recognized in the Seventh Circuit
The same circuit court that applied 440(a) retroactively in
Chow previously refused to apply the statute retroactively in
Reyes-Hernandez v. 1NS Reyes-Hernandez developed an
exception to the generally accepted retroactivity of section 440(a)
to pending petitions.88 Reyes-Hernandez, a lawful permanent
resident of the United States, was convicted of possession of
cocaine and of a subsequent comparable violation. 9 He conceded
deportability, but sought relief under section 212(c) of the INA.!
After a hearing, an IJ denied Reyes-Hemandez's application, and
the BIA affirmed this denial and issued a final order of
deportation.9'
Reyes-Hernandez moved for review of the deportation order
pursuant to section 106(a) of the INA, as codified in 8 U.S.C. §
1 105a(a), which, prior to AEDPA enactment, granted federal
courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders.2
However, in April of the same year, the AEDPA was signed and
section 440(a) of the AEDPA amended section 106(a) of the INA
85 See infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text (discussing Reyes-Hernandez v.
INS, 89 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1996)).
86 See, e.g., Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (1997) (stating that "[the
court] express[es] no opinion on these matters, but simply observe[s] that they are left
undecided by today's opinion").
87 89 F.3d 490 (1996).
88 See id.
89 See id. at 491.
90 See id.; see also supra note 19 (detailing the discretionary relief available
pursuant to section 212(c) of the INA).
91 See Reyes-Hernandez, 89 F.3d at 491.
92 See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (Supp. 1994), repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C,
tit. III, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612 (1996).
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to preclude judicial review of final orders of deportation in cases
involving any of the enumerated crimes." Because no effective
date was included within the amendment, the court relied on
Landgraf to help determine whether to apply the provision
retroactively." The court noted, "If a new procedural or
jurisdictional provision would if applied in a pending case attach a
new legal consequence to a, completed event, then it will not be
applied in that case unless Congress has made clear its intention
that it shall apply."95 Thus, the court examined whether Reyes-
Hemandez would have conceded deportability had he known that
his option to seek judicial relief under 212(c) and his opportunity
for review by this court would be barred by the AEDPA.96
Moreover, the court contemplated Congressional intent and
determined, "[W]e think it unlikely that Congress intended to
mousetrap aliens into conceding deportability by holding out to
them the hope of relief under section 212(c) only to dash that hope
after they had conceded deportability."97 The court concluded that
making the concession of deportability a bar to relief under section
212(c) attaches a new legal consequence under Landgraf9  Thus,
the court held that section 440(a) does not apply retroactively to
cases in which deportability was conceded before the enactment of
the AEDPA, provided that "the applicant for discretionary relief
would have had at least a colorable defense to deportability; for if
not, he lost nothing by conceding deportability." 99  The court
maintained its jurisdiction over the petition for review in this
limited, circumstance even though section 440(a) is usually
construed to divest federal courts of appeals of their authority to
93 See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1996).
94 See Reyes-Hernandez, 89 F.3d at 492; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 256 (1994) (holding that absent clear congressional intent or implication,
a legislative enactment affecting substantive rights must not be applied retroactively).
95 Id.; see also supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (discussing the
requirements of Landgraj).
96 See Reyes-Hernandez, 89 F.3d at 492 (recognizing that § 440(d) of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act amended § 212(c) of the INA to make aliens
convicted of certain enumerated crimes ineligible for relief under that section).
97 Id.
98 See id. at 492-93.
99 Id. at 493.
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review such deportation orders. °°
B. The Second Circuit's Application of Section 440(a)
In Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, the Second Circuit examined the
effect of the AEDPA on petitions filed for review prior to the
statute's effective date.'0 ' The petitioner, a lawful permanent
resident of the United States, was convicted of drug violations and
served a twenty-month prison sentence. 10 2  When the INS
commenced deportation proceedings under sections
241(a)(2)(B)(i) and 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, the petitioner
conceded deportability but sought discretionary relief under
section 212(c) of the INA. 3 The IJ denied petitioner relief and
ordered deportation. °4 After the BIA affirmed the IJ's decision,
the petitioner filed an application with the court for review of
BIA's order, but the Government moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.0 5
Like other circuit courts,' °6 the Second Circuit determined that
section 440(a)'s bar to judicial review may be applied to petitions
filed prior to the effective date of the Act.'0 7 Quoting Landgraf,
the court noted, "[A]pplication of a new-jurisdictional rule usually
'takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal
that is to hear the case.""" The Second Circuit compared the case
before it to Hallowell v. Commons, which had been cited in
100 See, e.g., Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1996); Mendez-Rosas
v. INS, 87 F.3d 672, 673 (5th Cir. 1996).
1o' See Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1996).
102 See id. at 28.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See id. at 29.
106 See, e.g., Figueroa-Rabio v. INS,' 108 F.3d 110, 111 (6th Cir. 1997); Arevalo-
Lopez v. INS, 104 F.3d 100, 101 (7th Cir. 1997); Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352,
355 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 789 (1st Cir. 1996); Salazar-Haro
v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1996); Mendez-Rosas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672, 674 (5th
Cir. 1996); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396, 400(9th Cir. 1996).
107 See Hincapie-Nieto, 92 F.3d at 29.
108 Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (quoting
Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916))).
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Landgraf.'9 In Hallowell, the Supreme Court considered a statute
that deprived federal courts of jurisdiction over certain Indian
disputes and granted such authority to the Secretary of the
Interior."' Similarly, section 440(a) removed jurisdiction over
pending petitions for review from the federal courts of appeals and
withdrew the possibility of judicial review for petitioning aliens."'
Reasoning by analogy, the Second Circuit held that "Hincapie-
Nieto's prior right of judicial review via a petition for review is no
more a substantive right than was Hallowell's prior right to have
his claim adjudicated in a district court."" 2
In Hincapie-Nieto, the court discussed and ultimately rejected
the Seventh Circuit's creation in Reyes-Hernandez of an exception
to retroactive application to pending petitions for aliens who
maintained a colorable defense but conceded deportability."3 The
court expressed skepticism of the rationale behind the Reyes-
Hernandez exception." 4 Namely, the court doubted that "any alien
concedes deportability only because of the expected possibility of
section 212(c) relief and the availability of a petition for review of
the denial of such relief. It is far more likely that deportability is
conceded because there is no conceivable defense available.""' 5
Therefore, the court remained unconvinced by Reyes-Hernandez
and refused to assert jurisdiction."6
Finally, examining the constitutionality of AEDPA, the
Second Circuit clarified that federal courts are not precluded from
all alien claims emerging from deportation proceedings."7 After
consulting with government attorneys, the court recognized other
habeas corpus remedies the petitioner might have."' While the
109 See id. (citing Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)).
11o See Hallowell, 239 U.S. at 508.
"I See Hincapie-Nieto, 92 F.3d at 29.
112 Id.
113 See id.; see also supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
114 See Hincapie-Nieto, 92 F.3d at 30.
115 Id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
I1s See id. (requesting government to comment on whether the abolition of the
court's jurisdiction to review the petition would also preclude other available forms of
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AEDPA bars judicial review of certain criminal acts committed by
aliens, and thus precluded Hincapie-Nieto from challenging his
deportation order by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he could
have challenged his detention by application for habeas corpus if
he were taken into INS custody." 9 Ultimately, the court held,
"Since the Government acknowledges that at least some avenue
for judicial relief remains available, we see no infirmity in the
repeal of our prior jurisdiction to entertain Hincapie-Nieto's
petition for review of his deportation order."'' 0
C. The First Circuit's Application of Section 440(a)
The First Circuit also considered the applicability of the
AEDPA on pending cases, as well as possible constitutional
objections to the Act.' In Kolster v. INS, the petitioner, a lawful
permanent resident of the United States, was indicted for
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.' After
pleading guilty, petitioner was sentenced to a two-year prison
term.' Despite the sentencing judge's recommendation that the
petitioner not be deported upon his release, the INS charged that
petitioner was deportable pursuant to sections 241(a)(2)(B)(i) and
241 (a)(2)(A)(iii) 2 4
During a hearing before an IJ, petitioner conceded his
deportability, but requested a continuance in order to pursue a
waiver of deportation under 212(c)." 5 The IJ denied his request
for relief and ordered Kolster's deportation.'26 The BIA affirmed
the IJ's decision and Kolster filed a petition for review with the
habeas relief petitioner might have).
I" See id. at 31.
120 Id.
121 See Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 786 (1st Cir. 1996).
122 See id.
12 See id.
124 See id. (noting that § 241(a)(2)(B)(i) is a controlled substance offense and §
241 (a)(2)(A)(iii) lists aggravated felonies).
125 See id. at 786.
'2s See id. "As to Kolster's request for a continuance, the Immigration Judge found
that Kolster did not have statutory eligibility for section 212(c) relief, and therefore
pretermitted his application for a waiver of deportation." Id.
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First Circuit Court of Appeals.' While the petition was pending,
Congress enacted the AEDPA, and the INS filed a motion to
dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
section 440(a).'28
Following other circuit courts, the First Circuit also relied on
Landgraf to provide the framework for determining whether the
statute should be applied to pending cases.'29 The court noted the
absence of clear congressional intent with regard to the effective
date for 440(a), looked to the "judicial default rule," and
determined that 440(a) did not retroactively impair Kolster's
substantive rights, liabilities or duties. 3 ° Despite petitioner's
argument that Landgraf merely contemplated a change of tribunals
and not the complete denial of judicial review, the court held that
the Supreme Court's reliance on Hallowell was significant. 3' In
Hallowell, the statute in question similarly deprived federal district
courts of jurisdiction and granted the Secretary of the Interior
"final and conclusive" authority.3 2  Similarly, section 440(a)
grants final authority in an administrative tribunal, namely the
BIA.
133
Kolster argued that he conceded deportability in reliance on
the application for a waiver pursuant to section 212(c).3 4
Unpersuaded by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Reyes-
Hernandez, the First Circuit held, "[I]t is unclear to us that
deportability, which is a largely mechanical determination based
on facts which may often be objectively ascertained, would
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See id. at 788 (declaring, that application of statute to pending cases is a
"question of legislative intent and not a constitutional question").
130 See id.
131 See id.; see also supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (discussing
Hallowell and its relevance to the revocation of federal court jurisdiction over pending
petitions for review).
132 See Kolster, 101 F.3d at 788 (citing Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508
(1916)); see also supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing Hallowell).
133 See id. at 788 (suggesting that a change from an Article III court to an
administrative decision maker does not effect retroactivity analysis, but not addressing
its effect on the constitutional analysis).
134 See id. at 788-89.
[Vol. 23
1998] ANTTERRORISM AND EFFECrIVE DEATH PENALTY Acr 465
realistically be conceded because of the availability of
discretionary relief or of judicial review of the denial of such
relief."'35 Furthermore, the petitioner never contended that he had
a colorable defense to deportability 3 6 Finally, in light of prior
decisions, the court noted that aliens do not have a "cognizable
reliance interest" in the possibility of section 212(c) judicial
relief.
3 7
The First Circuit next considered the constitutional challenges
raised by the petitioner.' Specifically, Kolster asserted that
section 440(a)'s bar of judicial review of final deportation orders,
based on statutorily enumerated crimes, violated the Due Process
Clause and the separation of powers as found in Article Il of the
Constitution.3 With respect to his due process claim, Kolster
argued that deportation denied him a constitutionally protected
liberty interest and that the Due Process Clause ensures certain
procedural protections, including judicial review.' The INS
contended that section 440(a) was "clearly a constitutional
exercise of Congress's well-established power to provide or
withhold jurisdiction from statutorily-created courts, as well as its
plenary power over matters of immigration and naturalization.'"4
Even with the INS's explanation, the court recognized the gravity
of the constitutional challenge and solicited additional briefing as
to the availability of habeas corpus review for aliens who are
135 Id. at 789.
136 See id. (citing Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1523 (3rd Cir. 1996)); see
also Campos v. INS, 16 F.3d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that where a provision of
the Immigration Act of 1990 made the operative language of section 212(c)
inapplicable, a petitioner's request for a waiver of deportation must be denied); Barreiro
v. INS, 989 F.2d 62, 64 (1st Cir. 1993) (precluding petitioner's waiver of deportation
despite the fact that his seven-year prison sentence, largely served before the
Immigration Act of 1990, was nevertheless within the Act's provision prohibiting
waiver for an alien convicted of aggravated felony who had at least a five-year prison
sentence for that felony).
'31 See Kolster, 101 F.3d at 789. "The availability of purely discretionary relief
does not create substantive rights in otherwise deportable criminal aliens, nor does the
availability of judicial review of denial of that discretionary relief." Id.
138 See id. at 790.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 Id.
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covered by section 440(a)'s preclusion of judicial review.'42
The First Circuit recognized the breadth of Congress's plenary
power over immigration matters, but noted that the Supreme Court
had observed:
[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence his
constitutional status changes accordingly. Our cases have
frequently suggested that a continuously present alien is entitled
to a fair hearing when threatened with deportation, and,
although we have only rarely held that the procedures provided
by the executive were inadequate, we developed the rule that a
continuously present permanent resident alien has a right to due
process in such a situation.'43
Significantly, the court framed the constitutional issue at hand
by asking:
Where the consequences of the decision are the deportation of a
continuously present alien, may Congress, by precluding
judicial review of final deportation orders, place final authority
over a question of law.., in the hands of an administrative
body (i.e., the BIA), or does the Constitution require an
independent judicial determination of questions of law, or at
least of whether the agency's determination was a reasonable
construction of the statute?'"
However, the court was not compelled to answer the
constitutional challenges since other avenues of judicial review
were available to the petitioner. 45  The INS acknowledged that
habeas review mandated by the Constitution still existed and thus
provided a means for judicial review of the constitutional and
jurisdictional issues involved.'" Therefore, given the alternative
142 See id.
143 Id. (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) (internal citations
omitted)).
1 Id.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 790-91.
The INS's precise position is that such constitutionally compelled habeas
review, or its equivalent, remains, and that we need not here determine
"whether the jurisdictional basis for 'constitutional habeas' review of a
deportations order would be 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, or a 'free
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avenues of judicial review, the court declared that section 440(a)'s
repeal of jurisdiction for judicial review of final deportation orders
did not violate the Constitution.'7
D. The Eleventh Circuit's Application of Section 440(a)
Constitutional issues relating to section 440(a)'s bar of judicial
review were raised before the Eleventh Circuit in Boston-Bollers v.
/NS." Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United
States, pled guilty to a charge of second degree murder and was
sentenced to a twelve-year prison term.'49 After his sentencing, the
INS commenced deportation proceedings against the petitioner,
and thereupon the petitioner conceded his deportability based on
his conviction and requested relief pursuant to section 212(c) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act.'0 The IJ refused to grant
discretionary relief and ordered petitioner's deportation.' The
BIA upheld the judge's decision and mandated a final deportation
order. 2 Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review in the
Eleventh Circuit and the INS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction upon the enactment of the AEDPA.'53
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that 440(a) "is not retroactive
application affecting substantive rights, but is a prospective
application of a jurisdiction eliminating statute."' 154 With respect to
the constitutional challenges, the court relied on the plenary power
of Congress over matters involving immigration and noted that
since deportation is a civil and not a criminal proceeding, "[n]o
judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution."'55 Furthermore,
standing' constitutional authorization."
Id. at 790-91 n.4.
147 See id. at 791.
148 106 F.3d 352 (llth Cir. 1997).
19 See id. at 353. Under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, petitioner was subject to deportation. See id.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See id. at 353-54.
153 See id. at 354.
154 Id. The Eleventh Circuit's view was analogous to the view of the majority of
other circuits that had addressed the issue. See id.
155 Id. at 355 (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952)).
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the court held that section 440(a) does not violate Article HI of the
Constitution since the political branches of government have
traditionally had control over immigration issues."5 6 Quoting the
Supreme Court in Reno v. Flores, the Eleventh Circuit noted,
"[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete."'5 The court upheld the notion that
congressional authorization provided the only reason why federal
appellate courts previously held jurisdiction to review final orders
of deportation. 5 ' Thus, the court concluded, "[S]ection 440(a) not
only does not violate Article I, it is illustrative of the concept of
separation of powers envisioned by the Constitution."'59
E. The Seventh Circuit's First Impression of the
Constitutional Challenges of Section 440(a)
The Seventh Circuit considered the implications and
constitutionality of certain sections of the AEDPA in Yang v.
INS.'6  The four petitioners in the case either conceded
deportability or were determined to have committed crimes
enumerated within section 241(a)(2), codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1251,
and the IJ ordered their deportation. 6' The INS filed a motion for
the court to dismiss petitioners' request for judicial review. 16 2 All
four petitioners objected to the dismissal on the grounds that the
AEDPA provisions divesting the court of jurisdiction did not
apply to deportation proceedings instituted before April 24,
1996.63 Quickly dismissing the petitioners' argument, the court
noted, "[e]very court of appeals that has considered the question
has held that the current version of section 106(a)(10) applies to
pending cases."'"
156 See id.
157 Id. (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993)).
158 See id.
159 Id.
160 109 F.3d 1185 (1997). This case represents the first time the Seventh Circuit
addressed the constitutional objections to AEDPA. See id.
161 See id. at 1189; see also supra note 18.
162 See Yang, 109 F.3d at 1190.
163 See id.
164 Id.
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Recognizing the need to address its previous holding in Reyes-
Hernandez, the Seventh Circuit explained the underlying policy
considerations of the court.'65 In Reyes-Hernandez, the court was
concerned that an alien, with a colorable defense, might concede
deportability in order to facilitate judicial relief pursuant to section
212(c), only then to be deprived of the possibility of judicial relief
under the amended section 106(a)(10).' 6 The Yang court refuted
the perception that conceding deportability might expedite a
request for relief under section 212(c) and asserted that concession
"complicates, and sometimes forecloses, that possibility.' 6 7  In
this case, Yang was the only petitioner to claim that he had a
colorable defense to deportation; thus, he potentially was within
the narrow exception created by Reyes-Hernandez.168 Although his
defense was colorable, the court refused to find Yang within the
exception since he was unable to demonstrate "how the change of
law pulled the rug out from under his litigating strategy.'
69
The court next considered whether Yang could renew his
argument that he was not deportable under sections 241(a)(2)(C)
and 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) in order to convince the court that judicial
review was permissible regardless of section 106(a)( 10). '70 The
court looked to the Department of Justice where three of four
counsel concluded that judicial review was not permissible under
those circumstances. 7 ' According to the majority view, the court
lacked jurisdiction if the BIA found that a person was an alien
deportable for a statutorily enumerated reason. The one
differing Justice Department attorney argued in a dissenting
opinion that the "court may (indeed, must) determine for itself
whether the petitioner is (i) an alien (ii) deportable (iii) by reason
165 See id. at 1191; see supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
1 See id.
167 Id.
168 See id.
169 Id. "Reyes-Hernandez is a decision with a limited domain[,] ... a domain that it
would be inappropriate to expand given the force of precedent in other circuits." Id.
170 See id. at 1191-92. These former two statutory sections enumerate firearm and
multiple criminal conviction offenses. See id.
171 See id. at 1192.
172 See id.; see supra note 18.
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of a criminal offense listed in the statute."173 According to this
view, the court must give deference to the BIA's determinations,
but "if even with deferential review the BIA's conclusions cannot
be sustained, then 106(a)(10) falls out of the picture. ' 74
The court further articulated that the dissent's position found
support in the statutory language. 7 1 Specifically, the court
suggested that "[w]hen judicial review depends on a particular fact
or legal conclusion, then a court may determine whether that
condition exists."'' Moreover, the court argued, "We think it
highly unlikely that Congress meant to enable the Attorney
General to expel an alien with a clean record just by stating that
the person is a criminal, without any opportunity for judicial
review of a claim of mistaken identity or political vendetta.'
177
The court further noted that giving the statute such an
interpretation helps resolve potential constitutional dilemmas.'
Neither Reyes-Hernandez nor any other Seventh Circuit case
raised constitutional objections to section 106(a)(10).'79 Thus, in
Yang, the Seventh Circuit examined potential challenges for the
first time.8 The court first discussed the possibility of seeking
either the constitutional writ of habeas corpus or a writ under 28
U.S.C. § 2241.181 The court placed little weight on the
constitutional writ since it did not provide petitioners with what
they needed, namely "review of discretionary decisions by the
political branches of government."'82 Furthermore, the court noted
173 Yang, 109 F.3d at 1192.
174 Id.
175 See id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See id. See generally infra notes 196-223 and accompanying text (discussing
the potential constitutional restrictions of the AEDPA in light of the Due Process Clause
and the separation of powers provisions of Article III).
179 See Yang, 109 F.3d at 1195.
180 See id. ("[Ojur prior opinions.., did not consider constitutional objections to
section 106(a)(10)... and the time has arrived to do so.").
181 See id.; see generally supra note 68 (describing the various forms of statutory
and constitutional habeas relief available to resident aliens).
182 Yang, 109 F.3d at 1195.
[Vol. 23
1998] ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECrIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT 471
that the intent of the legislation was to facilitate removal of
criminal aliens and "not to delay removal by requiring aliens to
start the review process in the district court rather than the court of
appeals."'' 3 As for the possible writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the
court held that the petitioners' claim would not be viable since it
alleged error and not that the Attorney General refused to
acknowledge existence of a discretionary power. '" Thus, the
petitioners' only viable potential avenue for judicial review was
section 106(a).'
The Yang court next analyzed whether it was constitutionally
permissible for Congress to preclude the possibility of judicial
review under section 106(a).8 6 The Supreme Court had previously
recognized that lawful aliens of the United States are entitled to
due process of law before they are deported."7 Accordingly, the
court observed that the AEDPA provides an alien with notice of
the charges, an opportunity to present evidence, assistance of
counsel, and appellate review.' 8 Moreover, the INS maintains the
burden of proving by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"
evidence that the alien is deportable."9 Thus the process available
ensures that the fundamental requirements of due process, notice,
and the opportunity to be heard are met.'9  According to the
Seventh Circuit, amended section 106(a) secures an independent
judicial role in determining whether an alien is deportable such
that both an agency and a court together must conclude that a
person is "(i) an alien who is (ii) deportable (iii) by reason of
serious crimes."'9' Thus, "[u]nless the Constitution bestows a right
to have Article III judges review an executive decision to
implement an established right to deport an alien, section
183 Id.
184 See id.
185 See id. at 1196.
186 See id.
187 See id. (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982)).
188 See id. at 1196.
189 Id. (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966)).
190 See id.
191 Id.
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106(a)(10) must be respected."'92
With respect to the petitioners' claim that Article III prevents
political branches from restricting the powers of the judicial
branch, the court relied on the Supreme Court's explanation in
Carlson v. Landon: "The power to expel aliens, being essentially
a power of the political branches of government, the legislative
and executive, may be exercised entirely through executive
officers, 'with such opportunity for judicial review of their action
as Congress may see fit to authorize or permit."" 93 Since Article
III authorizes Congress to establish lower courts and to determine
their jurisdiction, the limitations of section 106(a)(10) do not
offend the doctrine of separation of powers.' 4 In conclusion, the
court noted, "Section 106(a)(10) applies to this case, forecloses
judicial review, and comports with constitutional limitations on
the authority of the political branches."'9 5
IV. Significance of the Case
Given its relative novelty, the AEDPA promises to continue to
plague the U.S. court system with nuances and challenges
unforeseen by its drafters. As illustrated in Chow and other circuit
court decisions discussed, section 440(a) of the AEDPA has
divested federal courts of their power to review certain final
deportation orders. 6 With the exception of the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Reyes-Hernandez, federal courts have consistently
affirmed the application of section 440(a) to pending petitions for
review. 7 Indeed, the anomaly to retroactivity created by the
Reyes-Hernandez decision has been narrowly construed and has
192 Id.
193 Id. (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 & n.28 (1952) (citing United
States ex. rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1904))).
194 See id. at 1197.
195 Id. "Unless Article III compels Congress to vest in the inferior federal courts as
much judicial power as Article III permits them to possess--an inconceivable reading of
the Constitution-it interposes no obstacle to the amended section 106(a)(10)." Id.
196 See, e.g., Boston-Bollers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (11 th Cir. 1997); Kolster v. INS,
101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1996);
Mendez-Rosas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 1996); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396 (9th
Cir. 1996).
197 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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been met with skepticism in other circuits. 9
Despite the nearly unanimous application of the AEDPA's
section 440(a) to pending suits, the statute itself has provoked
numerous constitutional challenges concerning due process and
the separation of powers doctrine. 99 Thus far, these constitutional
challenges have been rejected or largely ignored by the federal
courts.200 As the Seventh Circuit's recent decisions in Yang and
Chow reveal, there is an underlying and unresolved tension
between Congress's plenary power over immigration matters and
the due process rights of lawful resident aliens. Revisiting the
plenary doctrine extensively referenced in the cases above
illuminates the impact of the AEDPA on the due process rights of
lawful alien residents such as King Sang Chow and Ter Yang.
The plenary power doctrine was instituted more than a century
ago when the Supreme Court confirmed congressional authority to
send resident aliens home in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.2°"
Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court still recognized that the
"power to expel or exclude aliens . . . [is] . . . a fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political
departments largely immune from judicial control. ' 2 2 Although
without textual support in the Constitution and mercurial in its
dimensions, the plenary power doctrine essentially provides that
"Congress and the executive branch have broad and often
exclusive authority over immigration decisions. Accordingly,
courts should only rarely, if ever, and in limited fashion, entertain
constitutional challenges to decisions about which aliens should be
admitted or expelled." 203 In fact, not a single challenge of federal
198 See supra notes 10 1-95 and accompanying text.
199 See Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (11 th Cir. 1997); Kolster v. INS, 101
F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1996).
200 See generally Kolster, 101 F.3d at 785 (determining that as long as some form of
habeas review existed, the scope of judicial review as a matter of statutory interpretation
did not require addressing the constitutional issues).
201 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
202 Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396, 399 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
203 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547
(1990).
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legislation proscribing the deportation of resident aliens has
succeeded. 04 Furthermore, some general constitutional restrictions
on legislative action, such as the Ex Post Facto Clause, are
inapplicable to any immigration matters.2 5 From this vantage
point, the potential for conflict between plenary power over
immigration matters, essentially shielded from judicial
intervention, and the private rights of lawful resident aliens is
apparent.
The "absoluteness" of the plenary power doctrine has been
eroded slightly by judicial decisions carving out exceptions for due
process claims. The Supreme Court affirmed that it would hear
procedural due process challenges to deportation orders in the
Japanese Immigrant Case.06 In that case, the Court held that
[t]his court has never held, nor must we now be understood as
holding, that administrative officers, when executing the
provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may
disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in "due process
of law" as understood at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution.20 '
Resolving the struggle between these two competing legal
traditions is paramount to the AEDPA and its ultimate effect on
deportation proceedings of lawful resident aliens.
Judicial history clearly demonstrates the long standing struggle
to balance the constitutional rights of resident aliens with
Congress's power and political agenda.28 At issue in Chow and
Yang is the minimal constitutional requirements accorded to
resident aliens so as not to offend due process.29  In Yang, the
Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to investigate the due process
204 See DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 55-
56 (3d ed. 1992).
205 See Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Review, supra note 8, at 1850.
206 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903).
207 Id.
208 See generally Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Review, supra note 8, at
1850 (suggesting that the Due Process Clause and Article III present constitutional limits
on Congress's plenary power over immigration legislation).
209 See generally Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (providing the
framework for due process analysis for civil litigation); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21 (1982) (holding that the Matthews balancing test is applicable to immigration cases).
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challenges to section 440(a) of the AEDPA . While the court in
Yang squarely rejected the argument that 440(a) violated the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, it did not entirely foreclose the
possibility of judicial review of constitutional claims under
440(a).21"
Just a few months later, however, the Seventh Circuit decided
Chow. 212  Thus, Chow represents a broadened statutory
interpretation of section 440(a). Chow prohibits petitioners
convicted of any of the crimes enumerated in 440(a) from judicial
review under section 106(a) of the INA.13 The court refused to
read an exception for constitutional claims into the language of
440(a) of the AEDPA.214 Chow makes deportable without judicial
review any petitioner convicted of crimes specified in 440(a), even
petitioners with constitutional challenges.2"*
Along with the majority of circuit courts, the Seventh Circuit
relied on the availability of other avenues of habeas corpus to
protect against due process challenges.' Despite the court's
attempts in Chow to present other forms of habeas corpus relief as
viable options, the same court had previously lamented that the
constitutional writ available pursuant to Article I, section 9, clause
2 writ "does not offer what our petitioners desire: review of
discretionary decisions by the political branch of government."217
Moreover, as also observed in Yang, beginning April 1, 1997, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRA) abolished review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, thus
210 SeeYang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997).
211 See id.
212 113 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1997).
213 See id. at 666.
214 See id. at 669. "However, that Congress's power to grant or restrict judicial
review in deportation proceedings is subject to judicial intervention under the
Constitution does not imply necessarily that a federal court of appeals such as this one
may retain jurisdiction over a petition raising constitutional claims." Id.
215 See id.
216 See, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 790 (1st Cir. 1996); Hincapie-Nieto v.
INS, 92 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1996).
217 Yang, 109 F.3d at 1195.
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leaving section 106(a) as many petitioners' only alternative."'
Because section 106(a) has been all but foreclosed, can the
agency's final determination, without any plausible options for
judicial review, be considered constitutional? Thus far, courts
have not been required to address this question. 9 Nevertheless, it
poses an interesting and inevitable issue under the AEDPA.
Moreover, as Chow demonstrates, without the protection of
judicial review, resident aliens can be deported if they have been
convicted of one of the crimes enumerated in section 241 (a)(2). 220
As the Seventh Circuit earlier submitted in Yang, "[i]ntrusion of a
reason other than a statutorily permissible one might well affect
the operation of section 106(a)." 2' Neither case explored the
possibility of deportation being ordered pursuant to section
241(a)(2), but in reality stemming from the Attorney General's
political agenda.222 Potential grounds for abuse of discretion
include racism, religious differences, discrimination born from
previous wars, and lingering cold war anxieties. 223 Thus, the
danger of the Chow decision, barring all constitutional challenges,
becomes obvious in light of such potential abuses of discretion.
"By stripping federal courts of the ability to hear certain cases,
Congress can prevent judicial 'interference' with its preferred
substantive outcomes, but such preemptive strikes must not run
211 See id.; see also 8U.S.C § 1252(g) (1994) ("Except as provided in this section
and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action of the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien under this chapter.").
219 "[C]ourts have largely resisted prodding by scholars and litigants to place some
limits on the federal power over this subject matter." WEISSBRODT, supra note 204, at
57.
221 See Yang, 109 F.3d at 1192.
221 Id.
222 See id. at 1192.
Suppose a future petitioner were to contend that the Attorney General regularly
remitted the deportation of criminal aliens who are Christian, but not those who
are Moslem. A contention that this had occurred might mean that the order of
deportation was not 'by reason of having committed a criminal offense' listed
in section 241 (a)(2), but was by reason of religion.
Id.
223 See WEISSBRODT, supra note 204, at 58.
[Vol. 23
1998] ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT 477
afoul of the Constitution." 2 4  Given the limitations on other
avenues of judicial review, as well as an agency's desire to
effectuate public policy goals, such as expedited deportation of
lawful resident aliens, the possibility of due process violations
should be carefully monitored.
Pursuant to the precedent of Chow, the Seventh Circuit was
subsequently compelled to decline to imply an exception for
constitutional challenges in Shmael Turkhan v. INS."' Referring to
Chow, the court noted, "We held.., that section 440(a) bars all
claims brought pursuant to INA section 106(a) if the petitioner is
deportable for having committed one of the criminal offenses
specified by section 440(a). '2 6 Even though the petitioner asserted
that he received inadequate assistance of counsel and that the BIA
violated due process by refusing to consider his mislabeled brief,
judicial review of these concrete constitutional claims was
precluded.27 As demonstrated by this decision, Chow effectively
denies judicial review of all constitutional challenges brought
pursuant to 440(a).
Chow and the Seventh Circuit's subsequent decision in
Turkhan manifest the most expansive reading courts have thus far
given to section 440(a). For example, the Ninth Circuit in
Dudulao v. INS suggested that judicial review may still exist for
certain constitutional challenges.228  Specifically, the court's
opinion emphasized, "The availability and scope of collateral
habeas review where the 'paramount law of the Constitution' may
require judicial intervention was not an issue before us."22' 9 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit, as well as several other circuit courts, 2 0 have not
construed section 440(a), as necessarily barring all constitutional
224 Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Review, supra note 8, at 1954.
225 123 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1997).
226 Id. at 490.
227 See id.
228 Dudulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996).
229 Id. at 400 n.4.
230 See, e.g., Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that at least
some avenue of judicial review exists through a writ of habeas corpus); Salazar-Haro v.
INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1996) ("To the extent . . . that constitutional rights
applicable to aliens may be at stake, judicial review may not be withdrawn by statute.").
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challenges. Against the legal history thus far created, Chow marks
the most sweeping statutory interpretation of section 440(a)
completely depriving the judiciary of any role in the issuance of
final deportation orders.
V. Conclusion
The AEDPA's section 440(a), stripping federal courts of
judicial review of final deportation orders, is subject to statutory
interpretation and constitutional restraints. Whereas the Supreme
Court has not yet considered the constitutionality of section
440(a), individual courts have begun to interpret the Act's
provisions and determine what constitutional minimums must be
met to avoid violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
or the principles of separation of powers of Article HII of the
Constitution.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Chow represents the barest
requirements needed to pass constitutional muster. In Chow, the
court interpreted section 440(a) as a bar to all claims brought
pursuant to section 106(a) of the INA, provided that the petitioner
was convicted of one of the crimes enumerated in section 440(a)
and some other avenue of judicial review was available. The court
went so far as to reject the petitioner's constitutional challenges-
both due process and the separation of powers claims--to section
440(a).
As precedent, Chow appears to deny future petitioners the
possibility of judicial review in a federal court even for legitimate
constitutional challenges, as long as some form of habeas relief
exists. In other words, petitioners will be unable to seek judicial
review of decisions in which there is reason to believe the
government has erred or even where an abuse of discretion has
occurred. However, if a future petitioner can prove that other
avenues of judicial review are unavailable, or perhaps is able to
prove their futility, courts will be forced to reconsider the
constitutionality of section 440(a) in the absence of habeas relief.
While section 440(a) thus far has been deemed constitutionally
valid, one scholar has cautioned:
The right to judicial review of Executive Branch action is a
cornerstone of our democracy. Without it, the rights guaranteed
by the Constitution are of little value. Never in our history have
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aliens been subject to a legal regime where they could be
deported or excluded without any recourse to the judiciary to
determine the fairness and legality of their removal.2'
Thus, section 440(a) promises to expedite the removal of
criminal aliens from the United States, but at the same time
potentially threatens the protection of fundamental fairness that
our Constitution affords both natural citizens of the United States
as well as permanent resident aliens.
KAREN REGAN
23 Lucas Guttentag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Federal Court Jurisdiction-
Statutory Restrictions and Constitutional Rights, in 30TH ANN. IMMIGR. &
NATuRALiZATION INST. 415, 432 (1997).

